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1958] RECENT CASES 173
The obvious purpose of Section 6 of the Uniform Act is to supplement the
federal constitutional grounds for extradition and thereby provide a com-
plete system for the extradition of criminals. It is this writer's belief that the
Colorado Supreme Court has failed to realize and to follow the spirit of the
law. It is further submitted that the need for uniformity of interpretation of
Section 6 of this Uniform Act is essential since these proceedings necessarily
involve two states.
RODNEY S. WEBB.
INJUNCTION - NATURE AND FORM OF REMEDY - DiFENjANT REQUIRED TO
POST BOND CONDITIONED ON CONFORMANCE WITH THE DECREE. - The Dis-
trict Court enjoined the defendant from using and maintaining certain pre-
mises described in the State's complaint, or any other premises within the
County, for purposes of lewdness, assignation or prostitution, and called. upon
her to give a bond in the sum of $5,000 conditioned upon her compliance
with the terms of the decree. On appeal the Supreme Court of New Mexico,
one judge dissenting regarding the bond requirement, held that the order
and the bond requirement be sustained in so far as they related to the pre-
mises described in the complaint. State v. Robertson, 31:3 P.2d 342 (N.M.
1957).
The act enjoined in the above case is a crime;' it constitutes a public
nuisance per se which is enjoinable with or without a statute expressly author-
izing injunctive proceedings.2  However, neither statutory provision nor ju-
dicial precedent has been found to support the requirement of a bond con-
ditioned on compliance with an injunction. 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court advanced but two cases to support its
sustainment of the bond requirement: City of Roswell v. Jacoby4 and State
ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court.5 The former case involved the question of
the legality of a municipal ordinance which required a bond of apothecaries
who would sell spirits, and which provided for forfeiture of the bond upon
conviction of a breach of the provisions of the ordinance pertaining to spirits.6
If this case is analagous to the principal case, it is no morc than tenously so.
State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court was cited as support for the propo-
sition that the requiring of a bond is a valid exercise of the discretion, in-
herent in equity's broad powers, in providing the means for the enforcement
of the injunction.7 The pertinent portion of the case cited reads that, "...
Constitution. Both cases were decided upon the reasoning set out in the Stobie case, supra
at 410, "(T]he warrant issued is not in accordance with the requisition; consequently it
is wholly ineffectual for any purpose." Contra, Ex parte Oxford, 157 Tix. Crim. 512,
249 S.W.2d 917 (1955) (extradition was authorized even though there was a technical
discrepancy in the grounds relied upon.).
1. N. M. Stats. Ann. § 40-34-1 to 40-34-5 (1953); N. D. Rev. Code § 12-2214
(1943).
2. State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 So. 71 (1918); State v. Gilbert, 129 Minn. 95,
147 N.W. 953 (1914). N. D. Rev. Code § 12-2214 declares that the utilization of any
structure' or conveyance for the purpose, of prostitution constitutes a common nuisance.
3. In this regard the dissenting justice observed, "I have tried to find in the books
authority justifying the requirement that the defendant post this bond, but have failed."
4. 21 N.M. 702, 158 Pac. 419 '(1915).
5. 101 Wash. 81, 172 Pac. 257 (1918)
6. It was held that the bond requirement of the ordinance was invalid in that the
forfeiture provision was penal in design; had the ordinance provided that the bond con-
stitute a contract for liquidated damages, it would have been valid, said the court.
7. See 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence 21 (13th ed. 1886) "... one of the most
striking and distinctive features of Couits of Equity is that they can adapt their decrees
to all the varieties of circumstances' which mduy arise ..
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a court of equity has power not only to decree, but to enforce its decrees in
its own way in the absence of a definite procedure."s Is not a contempt pro-
ceeding a definite procedure and the one usually invoked upon the violation
of an injunction?';
There is a line of cases in which courts of equity do require a bond of the
defendant. 1° However, these cases are readily distingnished from the prin-
cipal case in that the bond is a substitute for a temporary injunction. These
cases offer nothing in the way of analagous support for the principal case.
Among the questions the decision raises are: How long will the defendant
have to maintain the bond? What if the defendant i unable to post the
bond?" It is submitted that the requirement of a bond conditioned on con-
formance with an injunction is an anomaly for which there is no necessity.
As was cogently observed by the dissenting justice, "The arm- of a court of
equity is not, and there should be no intimation that it is. so short that it
cannot protect its orders without bringing in additional aid and assistance
by way of a bond."
JOHN C. STEWART.
MINES AND MINERALS - GRANTS BY GOVERNMENT OF MINERAL AND
MINING RIGHTS - RESERVATION BY STATE LAND DEPARTMENT. - In an action
to quiet title to certain realty against the state of Arizona, judgment was en-
tered adverse to the state. On appeal, one justice dissenting, the Supreme
Court of Arizona affirmed the Superior Court and held, that not withstanding
the fact that notice of sale of certain state lands stated that the patent was
to contain a reservation of all gas, oil, minerals, and mineral rights, such reser-
vation was void, because the statute' giving the State Land Department
power to sell did not authorize such reservation and no other statutes author-
ized such reservation. State v. Drew, 316 P.2d 1108 (Ariz. 1957).
The federal or state government may reserve title to minerals in public land
granted or sold by such government.2 Though the actual sale is committed to
the executive department, the authority to make such reservation rests en-
tirely with the legislature. 3 Where the legislative act authorizing sale makes
no reference to reservation of mineral rights, the question arises, as in the
instant case, as to whether or not the executive department has power to re-
serve such rights when making the sale. The jurisdictions which have passed
cn this question are divided, some holding that reservation of minerals may
not be made in the sale of state lands in the absence of constitutional or
8. 101 Wash. 81, 172 Pac. 257, 261 (1918) [Emphasis added].
9. See 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence 15 (13th ed. 1886) "Mr. Justice Blackstonv
. . . has truly said: 'The system of our Courts of Equity is a labored connected system,
governed by established rules, and bound down by precedents from which they do not
depart...' "; de Funiak, Equity, 20 21 (1950) "If the defendant fails or refuses to
obey the injunctive order or process of the court, he is in contempt of court." "The
punishment imposed for contempt may be either by fine or imprisonment or both."
10. See, e. g., New Jersey and North Carolina Land and Lumber Co. v. Gardner-
Lacy Lumber Co., 113 Fed. 395 (E.D.N.C: 1902).
11. As was queried by the dissenting Justice, ". . . why should a bond be required?
I know nothing of the financial standing of the defendant but wonder just what is in-
tended should result if she is unable to make a $5,000 bond." "If the defendant cannot
deposit the bond is she not then in contemPt? Having no money, must she go to jail?
Are ,we about to. return to -the. maintenance of cells. for poor debtors?"...
1. Ariz, A fn. e,.:ode. I '1.-40V.(1939).
2. -S).'A Summers, Oiland Gas 137 (1954). ...3n.. S s sn: v. Knsu , 1 CV. 1 1 ..1 . 5 (191.)"3. S&Wwessenger v. Kingsbury, 148 Clo. 611, 112 Pae. 65:(1910),.
